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NOTES
REMEDY GONE AWRY: WEIGHING IN ON WEIGHTED
VOTING
INTRODUCTION
The health of our republican form of government hinges on an
equitable and proportional system of representation. In order to lay
claim to legitimacy, a republican government must establish the
means for electing representatives in such a way that all holders of
the franchise are active and meaningful participants in the electoral
process. In the latter half of the twentieth century, American jurists
have understood this process as being one in which all voters have
a comparable voice in selecting their representatives.' Such a voice
must be comparable on two distinct levels: first, when citizens
select their representatives, and second, when the representatives
shape policy in their respective assemblies.2
The need for an accurate count was deemed so critical that the
Founders mandated a census process in the Constitution.' The
1. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533,555-56 (1964); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376
U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
2. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 555-56; Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 14; Gray, 372 U.S. at 379-80.
3. The Constitution states:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States
which may be included within this Union, according to their respective
Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free
Persons .... The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the
first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent
Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; see also id. amend. XIV, § 2 (amending the Constitution to take
into account the full citizenship of freed slaves).
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Constitution mandates that every ten years our nation attempt to
count the people within its borders so that government can be
adjusted to accurately reflect the needs and desires of the people.
The decennial census provides a method for determining the
proper apportionment of representatives for the people. The census,
however, is only the beginning of the process of establishing a fair
apportionment. Once the people are counted, the responsibility for
drawing and redrawing voting districts falls to legislatures.4
Although in some respects it is desirable for legislatures to shape
voting districts, the possibilities for abuse are especially palpable
in this setting. There have been numerous cases, for instance, in
which the legislative apportionment process was used as a means
of reducing the effective voting power of racial minorities.5 There
have also been occasions in which the state legislature was unable
to draw proper and fair voting districts.6 In both situations, the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause7 serves as the
primary means of vindicating a citizen's rights, and the federal
courts provide the appropriate forum. How the Fourteenth
Amendment should be applied, however, is a significantly more
ambiguous question.
This Note examines Korman v. Giambra, a case in which
political deadlock threatened to diminish the fairness of New York's
apportionment process. Instead of drawing district boundaries
from the bench when the legislature failed to apportion the districts
correctly, a federal district judge for the Western District of New
York instituted a system of weighted voting.9 The result of the
4. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407,414-15 (1977); Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 586; see also
Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 27 (1975); Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549, 552 n.4 (1972);
Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 85 (1966).
5. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
6. See, e.g., Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 540-51 (describing the Alabama legislature's failure
to reapportion legislative districts in response to the 1910 Census and each subsequent
decennial census, the legislature's inability to adopt a constitutionally acceptable
reapportionment plan prior to the 1962 elections, and the need for judicial intervention);
Baker, 369 U.S. at 189-95 (discussing the Tennessee legislature's failure to reapportion in
accordance with the decennial census after 1901 and recounting several aborted efforts at
reapportionment).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
8. No. 01-CV-0369E(Sr), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12818, at *1 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2001).
9. Id.
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weighted voting system was not a new electoral map reflecting
population shifts, but a change in the relative power of each elected
representative to reflect the disproportionate sizes of their constit-
uencies. '
In examining this temporary remedy, Part I explains the
reapportionment situation that recently faced western New York
and the weighted voting remedy devised by the court. Next, Part II
reviews methods prior courts have used both to remedy and avoid
equal protection violations in voting districts. In light of those
more traditional methods, Part III then considers the weighted
voting system with reference to "one person, one vote" principles,"
maintenance of racial equity, and efficiency. This analysis also
considers the potential for application of weighted voting systems
in other short-term and long-term scenarios. Although there may
be uses for weighted voting in the short term, this Note argues that
too many costs result from long-term use.
I. FACTUAL SCENARIO AND DESCRIPTION OF REMEDY
A. Getting to the Courthouse in Erie County
New York's Erie County, which contains the City of Buffalo and
its significant suburbs, had a seventeen-district legislative body
in 2001 when the reapportionment dispute began. The New York
State Constitution and the Erie County Charter require that the
state and county legislatures readjust their legislative districts in
accordance with population shifts made evident by the results of the
federal census.' 2 The year 2001 was an election year for the Erie
10. Id. at *4.
11. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 554-55; Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368,376-81 (1963); see also
Baker, 369 U.S. at 207-08 ("A citizen's right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by state
action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution.").
12. N.Y. CONST. art. III, §§ 4-5; ERIE COUNTY CHARTER art. II, § 201, available at
http://www.erie.gov/laws/eccode/ii.phtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2003); see also U.S. DEPT OF
COMMERCE, CENSUS BUREAU, 2000 CENSUS RESULTS: ERIE COUNTY, NEW YORK, available at
http://factfmder.census.gov/bf/_lang=en-vt name=DEC_2000_PL U_GCTPLCOIlgeo
_id=05000US36029.html (last visited Feb. 28, 2003) (listing population and racial makeup
of Erie County's population according to census track); U.S. DEPT OF COMMERCE, CENSUS
BUREAU, 2000 CENSUS MAPOFERIE COuNTY, NEwYORK, available at http/factfmder.census.
gov/servlet/ReferenceMapFramesetServlet?geo-id= 14000US36029003800&tree id=
20031 1885
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44:1883
County Legislature, and the reapportionment was scheduled to
occur prior to the election.'"
Erie County legislators proposed various plans for re-
apportionment.14 For the most part, the debate split along partisan
lines, with a few independent Democrats attempting to preserve
their interests by protecting the Party as a whole. 5 Ultimately,
the Democratic majority in the legislature passed its plan by a
vote of eleven-to-six. 6 Erie County Executive Joel A. Giambra, a
Republican, vetoed the reapportionment plan. 7 The legislature
was unable to muster the two-thirds vote required to override
Giambra's veto, due to some Democrats' decision to vote with the
Republicans. ' Just prior to the 2001 elections, the county's districts
thus remained in their 1990 form.
Alan Korman, a county resident, filed suit in state court, as-
serting that the population shift and the failure to reapportion
resulted in the dilution of his vote.' 9 Giambra, the primary named
420&_ypfCensus%202000&_lang=en (last visited Feb. 28, 2003) (indicating census tracks
for the 2000 at street level). The results and map, collectively, shall be referred to hereinafter
as CENSUS DATA. Various data sets from the 2000 Census can be found on all states and
counties through the Census Bureau's website at http://www.census.gov.
13. ERIE COUNTY CHARTER art. II, § 210, available at http:/www.erie.gov/laws/eccode/
ii.phtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2003).
14. Korman, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12818, at *2.
15. Intra-party disputes within the local Democratic Party spilled into the
reapportionment debate. Closed Process, Done Deal, BUFFALO NEWS, May 9, 2001, at B6,
available at 2001 WL 6344555. The Democratic Party's controlling faction attempted to
maintain as many safe seats as possible within the county legislature, but the nature of
demographic shifts was expected to cause losses somewhere for the Democrats. The
controlling faction's hope was to consolidate these losses so that they would be realized by
the more moderate and independent rival faction of the Party. Id.
16. Anthony Cardinale, Amherst Residents Assail Remap Plan, BUFFALO NEWS, May 31,
2001, at BI, available at 2001 WL 6346715. Independent Democrats crossed party lines and
voted with the Republicans, preventing the overriding of Erie County Executive Joel A.
Giambra's veto. The nature of the proposed districts was sufficiently unfavorable to the
independent Democrats that the independents were pushed into opposing the
reapportionment plan. Essentially, the controlling faction within the Democratic Party forced
the independents to choose between self-preservation and party loyalty.
17. Id.; Charity Vogel, Democrats Refuse toAccept Giambra's Veto, BUFFALONEWS, June
7, 2001, at C1, available at 2001 WL 6347288.
18. Charity Vogel, Controversial Redistricting Plan is Dead, BUFFALO NEWS, July 13,
2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 6351199.
19. Korman v. Giambra, No. 01-CV-0369E(Sr), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7634, at *1
(W.D.N.Y. June 5, 2001) (denying Korman's motion to remand the case to state court, from
which defendants had removed it).
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defendant, removed the suit to the Western District of New York
due to the federal constitutional questions presented.2' Korman
based his equal protection challenge on population figures alone,2'
as opposed to racial discrimination or rural-urban dispro-
portionality (or even reverse discrimination), which were the
underlying claims in many prior cases concerning equal protection
and voting.
22
The 2000 Census indicated a population shift from the City of
Buffalo and its immediate (or inner-ring) suburbs to the more
distant suburban areas of Erie County.2" The shift continued a
pattern in which predominantly middle-class Caucasian families
relocated further and further away from the county's urban
center.24 The result, over time, has been an increasing concentration
of minorities in the City of Buffalo as the population of the city,
relative to the county, has fallen.' Concurrently, the City of Buffalo
has become increasingly controlled by Democrats, whereas the
suburbs tend to be controlled more by Republicans. Race issues
aside, population shifts within the county merited reapportionment
of the county legislature's districts.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. For examples ofsuch equal protection challenges, see Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900
(1995) (addressing claim that Georgia's redistricting plan entailed racial gerrymandering);
United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995) (holding that Louisiana citizens lacked standing
because they did not live in the legislative district that was the focus of racial
gerrymandering); Shawv. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (finding allegation that North Carolina's
redistricting legislation was so irregular that it could only be the result of an attempt at
racial segregation was sufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted); Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (addressing claim that a Tennessee apportionment statute
denied plaintiffs' equal protection); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding a
claim sufficient .to state a cause of action that Alabama redistricting which removed all but
four or five of the four hundred black voters from the city of Tuskegee, but none of the white
voters, violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses).
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B. Remedy
After argument, District Judge John T. Elfvin considered several
proposals to redistrict, but decided not to adopt any of them.26
Instead of redrawing the district boundaries in accordance with one
of the proposals or implementing a redistricting plan of his own, in
August of 2001, he ordered that the legislative districts be frozen
for the duration of the 2001 election and thereafter until the new
government could agree on new districts or until March 15, 2002.27
The district boundaries under this order would remain the same as
they had been since the reapportionment reflecting the results of
the 1990 Census.
Judge Elfvin also ordered that each legislator elected in the
November elections receive a weighted vote until the 2003 elec-
tions, the duration of his term.' Each legislator's vote would be
proportionally weighted according to the fraction of Erie County's
population contained within the legislator's district.29 The legis-
lators' weighted votes would be calculated to three decimal places,
with the seventeen districts having seventeen total votes.3 ,
The results of the 2000 Census indicate that one-seventeenth of
Erie County's population is 55,898. l A hypothetical district with a
population of exactly 55,898 would, under the Korman formula, be
represented by a legislator with exactly 1.000 vote in the legis-
lature. One would calculate a legislator's weighted vote by taking
the 2000 Census population for his district and dividing it by the
average of 55,898. According to the 2000 Census, the least popu-
lated district is the Third District, containing 44,334 persons. This
district's representative, therefore, would receive a weighted vote
26. Korman v. Giambra, No. 01-CV-0369E(Sr), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12818, at *2
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2001). Both political parties intervened in the litigation, each providing
alternative plans for redrawing the Erie County Legislature's districts.
27. Id. at *4.
28. Each of the seventeen members of the Erie County Legislature represent single-
member district seats. ERIE COUNTY CHARTER art. 11, § 201, available at
http://www.erie.gov/laws/eccode/ii.phtml (last visited Feb.. 28,2003). Each legislator serves
a two-year term, after which all of the seats are simultaneously up for election. Id. § 202.2.
29. Korman, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12818, at *4.
30. Id. at *4-5.
31. See CENSUS DATA, supra note 12; see also Korman, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12818,
at *4.
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of 0.793.2 The most populous district is the Seventeenth District;
its 61,227 citizens would be represented by a weighted vote of 1.192.
Although the mathematics behind the weighted voting system
boils down to a simple calculation, the implementation of the
system and how it would operate over time is significantly more
complex. Judge Elfvin asserted that he would maintain jurisdiction
over the matter and stated in his opinion that he would devise and
implement his own reapportionment plan should the legislature fail
to put a redistricting plan in place by March 15, 2002."8 Judge
Elfvin left unclear whether such a judge-made plan would continue
to strictly employ the weighting system, incorporate the weighting
system into a larger hybrid mechanism, or simply redraw all of the
district boundaries in such a way that the county would return to
seventeen unweighted single-member districts and somehow meet
constitutional muster.
The political reality at the time, however, did not appear to
be any more conducive to reaching a legislatively and judicially
acceptable compromise. Although Democrats continued to have a
majority in the legislature, the weighted voting system served to
diminish that majority. In particular, Democrats in the Second,
Third, and Fifth Districts had their voting power reduced to
0.913, 0.793, and 0.888, respectively. 4 Meanwhile, Republicans
in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Districts, had their voting
power increased to 1.156 and 1.192, respectively. The Democratic
majority, unable to push through its reapportionment plan prior to
the election, found itself in an even weaker position than before,
and would have to offer significant concessions in order to bring
about a legislative solution. As a result of the November elections
and use of the weighted voting system, the Republican Party hoped
to put together a working majority in the legislature.36
32. Korman, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12818, at *5.
33. Id. at *5 n.3. For another case in which a district court demonstrated a willingness
to pull back from the reapportionment process in favor of an acceptable legislative
compromise, see Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 587 (1964). Generally, courts will involve
themselves in reapportionment disputes only so far as justice requires.
34. Korman, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12818, at *5.
35. Id.
36. Charity Vogel, Power Play; The GOP and the County Executive Won Control of the
Legislature; On Tuesday, Thanks to Albert DeBenedetti, A Dissident Democrat; Who Says
20031 1889
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Judge Elfvin suggested that the primary motivation for the
weighting system was the preservation of continuity in the elec-
tion process and prevention of unduly burdensome confusion for
voters and candidates alike.3" The need to avoid many of the
reapportionment difficulties, especially those involving candidate
residency requirements, 38 arose because Korman brought the equal
protection challenge so close to the 2001 elections. Redrawing
district boundaries three months before the election could have
resulted in chaos. Judge Elfvin deemed the possibility of confusion
over weighted votes more acceptable than the chaos resulting from
changing the districts in which candidates would seek election, and
this Note will consider the implications of his decision.
II. FIRST PRINCIPLES AND PRIOR APPLICATION
Judge Elfvin's remedies starkly contrast with the methods that
are normally used to handle a situation like that found in Erie
County. This Part looks back to earlier cases and traditional court
methods for resolving reapportionment disputes and related equal
protection challenges.
A. Civil Rights: One Person, One Vote
If there is one principle at the core of the resolution of any
dispute over voting rights or reapportionment, it is the principle of
one person, one vote. First articulated in Baker v. Carr39 and
further developed in subsequent cases,'0 the principle mandates
Support for Joel A. Giambra Can Be Built Issue by Issue, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 8, 2001, at
Al, available at 2001 WL 6362949 (noting that so long as dissident Democrat Albert
DeBenedetti continued to align with Republicans and County Executive Giambra, a working
majority of 8.502 votes in the seventeen-member legislature could be formed).
37. Korman, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12818, at *3.
38. Id. As with many jurisdictions, Erie County has a requirement that legislators reside
within the district that they represent. ERIE COUNTY CHARTER art. II, § 202.1, available at
http://www.erie.gov/laws/eccode/ii.phtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2003). Reapportionment might
have caused incumbents and challengers to be moved into different districts. Korman, 2001
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12818, at *3.
39. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
40. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1
(1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963).
1890 [Vol. 44:1883
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that each voter have an equal voice in selecting one's state and local
representatives, and thus, through those elected representatives,
have an equal vote in shaping policy. One person, one vote prin-
ciples must play a part in maintaining equal sizes of districts and
in preventing gerrymanders that disenfranchise minorities."' The
principles, out of necessity, must be maintained on two levels:
voter-to-voter (each vote must have equal weight in each contest)
and district-to-district (each representative must have a weight
appropriate to the size of his constituency to protect the weights of
individual votes).' 2
Reynolds v. Sims' involved the reapportionment of Alabama's
state legislature and three distinct plans to accomplish it. The first
plan, already in place when the Supreme Court considered the
issue, had representative districts with populations ranging from
6731 to 104,767 and senate districts' populations ranging from
15,417 to 634,864." The second plan called for a state constitutional
amendment, and yielded per-representative variances from 10,726
to 42,303 and provided one senator per county (with county
populations ranging from 10,726 to 634,864).' The third plan was
a standby measure, with per-representative populations varying
from under 20,000 to more than 52,000 and senate district popu-
lations ranging from 31,175 to 634,864.4' The three-judge district
court panel held all three plans unconstitutional and ordered a
temporary reapportionment that used the amendment's proposal
concerning the representatives and the standby measure for the
senate. 7 The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's ruling,
allowing the temporary reapportionment as ordered.4
The Court in Reynolds cited the principles of "one man, one vote"
when it stated:
41. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (finding adequate grounds for an equal
protection challenge against voting districts in Alabama, which removed black voters from
the city of Tuskegee in order to minimize minority representation).
42. Reynold8, 377 U.S. 533; Gray, 372 U.S. 368.
43. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
44. Id. at 545-46.
45. Id. at 543-44.
46. Id. at 544-45.
47. Id. at 586-87.
48. Id. at 587.
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Legislators represent people, not trees or acres. Legislators are
elected by voters, not farms or cities or economic interests. As
long as ours is a representative form of government, and our
legislatures are those instruments of government elected
directly by and directly representative of the people, the right
to elect legislators in a free and unimpaired fashion is a bedrock
of our political system. It could hardly be gainsaid that a consti-
tutional claim had been asserted by an allegation that certain
otherwise qualified voters had been entirely prohibited from
voting for members of their state legislature. And, if a State
should provide that the votes of citizens in one part of the State
should be given two times, or five times, or 10 times the weight
of votes of citizens in another part of the State, it could hardly
be contended that the right to vote of those residing in the
disfavored areas had not been effectively diluted. It would
appear extraordinary to suggest that a State could be consti-
tutionally permitted to enact a law providing that certain of
the State's voters could vote two, five, or 10 times for their
legislative representatives, while voters living elsewhere could
vote only once. And it is inconceivable that a state law to the
effect that, in counting votes for legislators, the votes of citizens
in one part of the State would be multiplied by two, five, or 10,
while the votes of persons in another area would be counted only
at face value, could be constitutionally sustainable. 49
Thus, disproportionately sized districts, be they as grossly dis-
similar as those in Reynolds, or only as different as those in
Korman, are a form of disenfranchisement. The Reynolds decision
was only the beginning of a protracted reapportionment dispute.
Given the disparate district sizes, more was needed to reach a set
of constitutionally satisfactory districts."0
B. Multimember Districts
One often employed method of handling reapportionment issues
is establishing multimember districts. Multimember districting
combines several nearby communities into one larger pool that is
49. Id. at 562.
50. Id. at 586-87.
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substantially larger than the average district. The voters of the
pool elect several representatives, often through some form of
cumulative voting.5'
Multimember districting is an easy solution to unconstitutional
population variances across districts. Through establishing multi-
member districts, a region can combine any number of sparsely
populated districts in such a way that their combination can elect
a reduced set of representatives that squares with their size. For
example, the combining of three smaller districts into one multi-
member district that elects two representatives ensures that voters
in other more highly populated areas do not have diminished power
vis-d-vis the voters in a population-diminished area. In short,
multimember districts simplify numerical equal protection issues.
Although construction of multimember districts is a quick way to
handle difficult reapportionment scenarios, the practice has been
the subject of great controversy. 2 It is unclear how multimember
districting affects minorities. On the one hand, cumulative voting
could help minorities in a majority-controlled district elect repre-
sentatives that they might not otherwise be able to elect under the
typical "winner-take-all" election scenario that occurs in single
districts."3 At the same time, however, it is also possible that other
interests in a large district could outvote a substantial minority
population and leave those minorities effectively unheard.5" In
addition, when there is more than one representative per pool,
citizens might find it difficult to point to a particular legislator they
can depend on to advocate for their concerns.
The controversy concerning multimember districts has resulted
in a general decline in their usage. Though multimember districts
51. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 333 (1973) (allowing the use of multimember
districts in a reapportionment plan for Virginia's House of Delegates due to special needs
concerning the residency of military personnel). But see Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 415
(1977) (stating the Court's preference for single-member districts where feasible in order to
avoid voter confusion and disenfranchisement).
52. See Pamela S. Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing: Single-Member Offices and the
Voting Rights Act, 77 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1991) [hereinafter Karlan, Undoing the Right Thing]
(noting that multimember districts were one method states use to dilute the impact of black
voters).
53. Id. at 7-8. Through a lack of majority candidates or through strategic use of
cumulative votes, a minority candidate may be elected.
54. Id.
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may suffice as an interim solution in reapportionment conflicts, the
costs of confusion and possibility of disenfranchisement associated
with multimember districts are substantial. The Supreme Court
itself has stated' that multimember districts should be avoided
whenever possible.55
C. Shaw v. Reno 6 and the Problem of Standing
One of the major procedural concerns in reapportionment
cases in Shaw and its progeny is standing.5 7 Simply put, a plaintiff
from the wrong district is powerless to stop discriminatory re-
apportionment plans. 58 The plaintiff has to demonstrate not only
the existence of an actual or imminent harm, but that the plaintiff
feels the harm in some direct, personal sense. Showing that one
resides within a gerrymandered or malapportioned district most
readily accomplishes this.59 When gerrymandering is involved, the
issue of standing can be quite complex. A court must determine
55. For example:
Because the practice of multimember districting can contribute to voter
confusion, make legislative representatives more remote from their
constituents, and tend to submerge electoral minorities and overrepresent
electoral majorities, this Court has concluded that single-member districts are
to be preferred in court-ordered legislative reapportionment plans unless the
court can articulate a "singular combination of unique factors" that justifies a
different result.
Connor, 431 U.S. at 415 (citations omitted). Connor marks the beginning of movement away
from multimember districting.
56. 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
57. See, e.g., Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995); United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737
(1995).
58. Hays, 515 U.S. at 745.
59. As the Supreme Court stated:
The injury which appellants assert is that this classification disfavors the voters
in the counties in which they reside, placing them in a position of
constitutionally unjustifiable inequality vis-d-vis voters in irrationally favored
counties. A citizen's right to a vote free of arbitrary impairment by state action
has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the Constitution ....
It would not be necessary to decide whether appellants' allegations of
impairment of their votes by the 1901 apportionment will, ultimately, entitle
them to any relief, in order to hold that they have standing to seek it. If such
impairment does produce a legally cognizable injury, they are among those who
have sustained it.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 207-08 (1962) (citations omitted).
1894
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precisely where on the electoral map the harm is being felt, a very
complex question.
The situation in Erie County, however, avoids the maze of
problems associated with standing. This is due to the basis of
Korman's challenge: population. In civil rights-based challenges,
there is often an isolated minority within the region that bears the
brunt of the harm resulting from reapportionment.60 As such, a
plaintiff must be found from within the isolated minority group in
order to bring the challenge. Depending on the construction of "safe
districts" or "majority minority districts," it may be possible to foil
those efforts.6' In order to find an adequate plaintiff, challengers
could be limited to an especially small part of an already isolated
minority population.
Vote dilution challenges based upon unbalanced districts,
however, seem to avoid most standing-related problems. If the
population across districts is not comparable, living and voting in
any of the diluted districts would serve as the basis for standing in
an equal protection challenge.
The Korman-style challenge, however, should not be construed
as a panacea for addressing all forms of discrimination and
infringements upon voting rights. It is only of use to a resident of
a large population district, left underrepresented by present
district boundaries. The Korman-style challenge is unavailable to
the resident of a smaller than average district, because the smaller
district's "overrepresentation" is actually a benefit, not a standing-
creating harm.
60. See Pamela S. Karlan, Still Hazy After All These Years: Voting Rights in the Post-
Shaw Era, 26 CuMB. L. REV. 287,290-91 (1996) [hereinafter Karlan, Still Hazy] (pointing out
that in Hays the Supreme Court found that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did
not live in the gerrymandered district).
61. See Hays, 515 U.S. at 742-43 (listing the elements of standing); see also id. at 750-52
(Stevens, J., concurring); Shaw, 509 U.S. at 662-63 (White, J., dissenting). Justices Stevens
and White, respectively, argue that even where district boundaries suggest gerrymandering,
a minority voter in a majority-minority district may not have standing to challenge the
constitutionality of voting districts because he does not suffer a legally cognizable injury as
a result of the gerrymander.
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III. COURTS AND LEGISLATURES
A. Drawing Districts
Reapportionment is understood by the courts to be a legislative
function, and as with other powers and duties that fall within the
legislative sphere, the courts afford the legislature a fair amount of
deference.6 2 This deference reflects an acknowledgment of the many
factors that come into play during the reapportionment process and
a realization that the legislature has a unique competence as a
result.6"
Reapportionment requires the gathering and assessment of a
wide array of data from the census. The legislature must also take
into account any special concerns rising out of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965." The legislature then determines the value of using any
number of geographic and local political boundaries in drawing
district lines. At each step of the way, the legislature is engaged
in the collection and evaluation of information. Serving as a fact-
62. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414 (1977); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735,
753-54 (1973); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 586
(1964); Cline v. Robb, 548 F. Supp. 128, 133 (E.D. Va. 1982).
63. As the Court stated in Connor:
We have repeatedly emphasized that "legislative reapportionment is primarily
a matter for legislative consideration and determination," for a state legislature
is the institution that is by far the best situated to identify and then reconcile
traditional state policies within the constitutionally mandated framework of
substantial population equality. The federal courts by contrast possess no
distinctive mandate to compromise sometimes conflicting state apportionment
policies in the people's name. In the wake of a legislature's failure
constitutionally to reconcile these conflicting state and federal goals, however,
a federal court is left with the unwelcome obligation of performing in the
legislature's stead, while lacking the political authoritativeness that the
legislature can bring to the task. In such circumstances, the court's task is
inevitably an ixposed and sensitive one that must be accomplished
circumspectly, and in a manner "free from any taint of arbitrariness or
discrimination."
Connor, 431 U.S. at 414-15 (citations and footnote omitted); see also Reynolds, 377 U.S. at
586.
64. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-1973bb-1 (2000) (including voting qualification procedures that
deny or abridge a citizen's right to vote based on race or color or proof that members of a
minority have less opportunity to participate in the political process than other
nonminorities).
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finder, in addition to representing the will of the people, the
legislature has a unique competence within this sphere.
Although the legislature is given substantial deference in deter-
mining the size and shape of electoral districts, equal protection
principles always limit its power in the districting process. Equal
protection principles require that district populations vary in only
minor ways so as not to dilute anyone's vote.65 In reviewing
reapportionment plans crafted by legislatures, courts look to
population variances as the primary constitutional concern.6"
Measurement of the gap between the largest and the smallest
electoral districts within a region can be complex and troublesome
for legislatures. In order to calculate population variance, the legis-
lature must begin with average population per district, dividing the
total population throughout the region by the number of districts.
Erie County has a population of 950,265 over seventeen districts,
resulting in an average population of 55,898.7 Next, the legislature
takes the largest district and calculates, as a percentage of the
average population, the difference in population between it and the
average population. The same is done with the smallest district in
the region, determining its difference from the average population.
In Erie County, the Seventeenth District has a population of 66,625,
roughly 19.2% larger than the average district." The Third District,
by contrast, has a population of 44,334, roughly 20.7% smaller
than the average district.6 9 Finally, the legislature adds the two
percentages in order to calculate the total population variance,
resulting in a variance of about 39.9% in Erie County.
Precedent suggests that courts should use ten percent as a cut-
off value when looking at population variance across districts.0
So long as there is a population variance of less than ten percent,
courts consider the legislature-crafted reapportionment plan to be
65. Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 560-61 (stating that equal representation for equal numbers
of people is a core principle of representative government).
66. See Connor, 431 U.S. at 416.
67. See Korman v. Giambra, No. 01-CV-0369E(Sr), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12818, at *4
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2001); CENSUS DATA, supra note 12.
68. Korman, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12818, at *5.
69. Id.
70. See Connor, 431 U.S. at 418.
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constitutional on its face." Only evidence of invidious discrimina-
tory practices can overcome that prima facie finding.72 Aligning
districts based on partisan interests does not alone rise to proof of
invidious discrimination."
The Equal Protection Clause's interest in keeping population
variances to a minimum is significant-other concerns, such as the
preservation of geographical and political boundaries, are secondary
to this principle. So long as the equal protection issues are handled
properly by the legislature, courts will allow legislatures to use
their discretion in determining whether significant geographical
and political boundaries should be maintained.74
Courts have even gone so far as to accept reapportionment plans
that otherwise would be entirely unreasonable save for the fact that
they maintained low population variances. One such example is
Cline v. Robb,75 a case arising in the Eastern District of Virginia.
In order to maintain a low population variance across House of
Delegates districts, a reapportionment plan combined Middlesex
County in the same district as Virginia's Eastern Shore. The two
areas are divided by twenty miles across the Chesapeake Bay, and
the overland route between the two areas consists of a two and one-
half hour drive, costing ten dollars in tolls and passing through
seven other districts.7" The federal court upheld the legislative
plan in Cline because the low population variance between districts
demonstrated that the plan met the requirements of equal pro-
tection and because there was no finding of discrimination. 7
Courts will also respect political considerations that factor
into the reapportionment process, as seen in a Connecticut
reapportionment case, Gaffney v. Cummings.78 The population
71. See id. at 419-20; see also White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (stating that the
maximum variation between districts is 9.9%); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973)
(holding that minor deviations do not make out a prima facie case of invidious
discrimination).
72. See Connor, 431 U.S. at 419-20.
73. Gaffney, 412 U.S. at 740-41.
74. See id. at 736 (addressing a Connecticut reapportionment plan); Cline v. Robb, 548
F. Supp. 128 (E.D. Va. 1982).
75. 548 F. Supp. 128 (E.D. Va. 1982).
76. Id. at 131 n.8.
77. Id. at 133-34.
78. 412 U.S. 735 (1973).
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variances in Gaffney were under the ten percent cut-off, but in
settling on its plan for reapportionment, the Connecticut legislature
passed on other plans that would have resulted in even lower
population variances. The Supreme Court upheld the Connecticut
legislature's reapportionment plan because it went far enough to
satisfy equal protection concerns.
79
Two considerations, town boundaries and partisan interests,
were the primary factors in guiding the Connecticut legislature's
decision leading to Gaffney. 0 The legislature sought to maintain the
integrity of as many town boundary lines as possible, incorporating
them into the drawing of district boundaries. There was also a
desire within the legislature to craft district boundaries in a way
that would secure a certain number of "safe seats" for each of the
two main political parties. After satisfying equal protection con-
cerns, the Connecticut legislature acted within its discretion in
adopting its preferred plan.8 1
Courts are very deferential to the legislature when re-
apportionment plans have a population variance of less than ten
percent, and even the existence of a variance greater than ten
percent does not necessarily doom a reapportionment plan. 2
Landing above the ten percent cut-off merely alters courts' pre-
sumptions and the burdens litigants must satisfy. Beyond the cut-
off, the legislature must account for why the population variance is
appropriate.8 3
The legislature has the opportunity to introduce evidence of
exigent circumstances that justify larger variances.8" Any number
of factors, including political boundaries and the location of military
bases, can provide adequate grounds for a substantial population
variance in the legislature's reapportionment plan.8'
Mahan v. Howell 6 is one example of a case in which the Supreme
Court allowed a population variance of 16.4%. Virginia wished to
reapportion its House of Delegates in light of the extensive military
79. Id. at 751-54.
80. Id. at 737-38.
81. Id. at 751-54.
82. See, e.g., Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
83. Id. at 320-21.
84. Id. at 320-22.
85. Id. at 329-30.
86. 410 U.S. 315 (1973).
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bases surrounding the Norfolk area. The difficult task of crafting
adequate districts given the area's saturation of military person-
nel was only compounded by a quirk in the gathering of census
data; census-takers used the location of a serviceperson's base
in determining his residency.87 As a result, Virginia faced census
data that reflected a military population officially residing at any
number of Norfolk-area bases, even though this population actually
resided in homes throughout the larger community. 8 Another issue
before the Court in Mahan was the fact that aside from the Norfolk
area, a significant number of the House of Delegates voting districts
were within a variance of five percent.8 9 The large variance value of
16.4% was brought about solely by the problem with counting
military personnel. The Mahan Court was willing to overlook
the large variance due to the rational policy justification for the
population variance. 90
Population variance, though it is the preferred tool of the courts,
can have a problematic application.91 As explained above, the meth-
od for calculating population variance is limited in scope, looking
only at the largest district and the smallest district within a region.
As such, a reapportionment plan covering a multitude of districts
can hinge upon the sizes of only two districts.
B. Different Standards of Review
When designed by the legislature, reapportionment plans natu-
rally receive greater leeway in population variances than court-
ordered reapportionment plans.9 2 Although there is no explicitly
mentioned "magic-number," like ten percent, that a court-ordered
plan must achieve in terms of its variance, a difficult standard
applies: Court-ordered plans are only allowed de minimis variance
87. Id. at 330-31.
88. Id. at 330 n.11.
89. Id. at 319.
90. Id. at 329-30. The State wished to maintain the political subdivisions in a way that
preserved naval voters' power over issues of naval concern pertinent in the Norfolk district.
Id. at 320-25.
91. Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407 (1977); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
92. Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1 (1975). See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text
for discussion of the reasons courts defer to legislators.
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in population across districts. 93 The Supreme Court best expressed
this difference in standards, stating:
Although every state reapportionment plan is fraught with its
own peculiar factual difficulties, it can hardly be said that this
Court has given no guidance of general applicability to a court
confronted with the need to devise a legislative reapportionment
plan when the state legislature has failed. We have made clear
that in two important respects a court will be held to stricter
standards in accomplishing its task than will a state legislature:
"[Uinless there are persuasive justifications, a court-ordered
reapportionment plan of a state legislature must avoid use of
multimember districts, and, as well, must ordinarily achieve the
goal of population equality with little more than de minimis
variation."9
The Court refused to hold that a 5.95% variance was constitutional
in a court-ordered reapportionment plan, illustrating its strictness
in reviewing court plans.95
Exigent circumstances can relax the standards faced by both
legislative and court-ordered reapportionment plans, but legis-
latures might have an easier time demonstrating the existence of
exigent circumstances .96 The entity crafting the plan has the burden
of demonstrating the existence of exigent circumstances. With its
fact-finding resources, the legislature has the most tools available
for doing this.
IV. ADVANTAGES OF WEIGHTED VOTING
A. Addressing "One Person, One Vote"
Judge Elfvin's opinion in Korman began with a recognition of the
one person, one vote principle, and a need for a remedy, when he
wrote, "Because one person-one vote is a bedrock Constitutional
93. Connor, 431 U.S. at 414; Chapman, 420 U.S. at 26-27.
94. Connor, 431 U.S. at 414 (quoting Chapman, 420 U.S. at 26-27).
95. Chapman, 420 U.S. at 25-26.
96. Id. at 26-27 ("[Ilt is the reapportioning court's responsibility to articulate precisely
why a plan of single-member districts with minimal population variance cannot be
adopted.*).
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right of each and every citizen, the present geographic boundaries
of the seventeen election districts comprising Erie County, the
territory served by the Erie County Legislature, are askew and
must be remedied."7 Any analysis of the weighted voting system
must consider the extent to which weighted voting is able to satisfy
one of the courts' most important concerns: one person, one vote.
Weighted voting is specifically designed to ensure that votes are
not diluted by improperly sized districts. Pursuant to a weighted
voting system, the drawing of district boundaries becomes moot
and what is really determinative of power is not where people
are situated, but how many people reside within a particular
community. If one could assume that all voters had an independent
assortment of beliefs concerning each and every policy issue, a
system of weighted voting may remove the political process from
pitfalls of the representative democracy and ensure that each policy
view would receive its proper voice. 98
The weight of a representative's vote is directly tied to the
population of his district. Thus, under weighted voting, larger dis-
tricts are represented by more influential legislators due to the
increased weight of their vote, and smaller districts are represented
by legislators with a diminished voice. Weighted voting correlates
population within a voting district to the representative's voting
power with astounding precision. If reapportionment in light of
population variance were only about making sure that votes not be
mathematically diluted, weighted voting would appear to be an
ideal constitutional solution.
B. Maintaining Geographic Boundaries and Desirable Districts
Weighted voting allows for the maintenance of geographic
boundaries in voting districts. There is also a much greater sense
of freedom accorded to the legislatures in crafting districts by
97. Korman v. Giambra, No. 01-CV-0369E(Sr), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12818, at *1-2
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 8,2001).
98. See Larry Alexander, Still Lost in the Political Thicket (or Why I Don't Understand
the Concept of Vote Dilution), 50 VAND. L. REV. 327, 331-35 (1997). Alexander's qualm with
vote dilution concerns its use in race-related equal protection challenges. Weighted voting
allows for voting districts ofvarying sizes and, as a result, relieves some of the pressures that
race can exert in the process of drawing districts.
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relieving the pressure to maintain district populations within a
tolerable degree of variance.
Pursuant to a system of weighted voting, cases such as Mahan
and Cline would arise with less frequency because the legislature
would no longer be under such heavy pressure to maintain district
sizes. Instead of being so intent on minimizing population variances
at the expense of geographic reasonableness, the legislature would
be able to take geographic concerns into account when drawing
district boundaries. Difficult decisions that lead citizens to question
resulting odd district boundaries would become a rarity if more
legislatures and courts employed weighted voting.
Weighted voting would even allow for the maintenance of
minority voting districts without offending the Shaw v. Reno line of
cases, as gerrymandering would no longer be necessary to create
majority-minority districts.99 The weighted voting system allows for
varying sizes of districts across a region, making it unnecessary for
legislatures to draw difficult gerrymanders in order to insure that
minorities would be able to elect minority representatives. Careful
use of the weighted voting system, involving the creation of smaller,
compact districts, is a better solution to ensuring that even an
isolated minority population preserves its political interests.
V. DISADVANTAGES OF WEIGHTED VOTING
A. Limited Short-Term Application
Certain characteristics of a weighted voting scheme suggest that
it can only be applied for short durations. The situation in Erie
County is a novel one, so there is not much in terms of supporting
scholarship or legal precedent. Indeed, most legal commentary on
voting rights and reapportionment in light of population variance
focuses its attention on traditional schemes. For instance, Professor
99. Weighted voting would allow for the crafting of districts of varying sizes. This could
be used to craft several smaller majority-minority districts without triggering a Shaw-style
challenge. For discussions ofwhether the Supreme Court, post-Shaw, is headed in the wrong
direction, see generally Pamela A. Karlan, Loss and Redemption: Voting Rights at the Turn
of the Century, 50 VAND. L. REV. 291 (1997); Karlan, Still Hazy, supra note 60; Karlan,
Undoing the Right Thing, supra note 52. For rebuttals of Karlan's position, see Alexander,
supra note 98; Christopher L. Eisgruber, Democracy, Majoritarianism, and Racial Equity:
A Response to Professor Karlan, 50 VAND. L. REV. 347 (1997).
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Richard Pildes considers alternative solutions that might avoid a
remedy as drastic as weighted voting, but most of his suggestions
involve mutations from the older, established methods of handling
reapportionment through judge-drawn redistricting or the
establishment of multimember districts. 00
It is not clear whether courts evaluate permanent and temporary
plans differently, but it seems that temporary plans might have a
lower standard to meet, provided there are exigent circum-
stances.101 The outcome of Reynolds suggests that a district court is
afforded more latitude in crafting a reapportionment plan when
there are severe equal protection problems with the current appor-
tionment and proposed changes. In such emergency circumstances,
the district court may adopt a temporary reapportionment plan
that would otherwise fail to pass equal protection muster so long
as it is the best present alternative and moves the electorate closer
to achieving an eventual equilibrium compatible with equal pro-
tection.10
2
Reynolds, as discussed earlier, involved the reapportionment of
Alabama's state legislative districts, and three distinct plans to
accomplish it. None of the proposed redistricting plans were close
to meeting constitutional muster. As a result, the three-judge
100. Richard H. Pildes, Principled Limitations on Racial and Partisan Redistricting, 106
YALE L.J. 2505 (1997). The multimember districts can be used to allow larger population
areas to elect multiple representatives as opposed to having several smaller districts elect
one representative each. On its face, the multimember district has the appeal of simplifying
redistricting issues and preserving minority voices in legislatures by avoiding the standard
winner-take-all system. The practical mechanics of multimember districts, however, might
not be as clear cut as suggested.
101. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 585-87 (1964).
102. As the Court stated in Reynolds:
[Tihe lower court's ordered plan was intended only as a temporary and
provisional measure and the District Court correctly indicated that the plan
was invalid as a permanent apportionment. In retaining jurisdiction while
deferring a hearing on the issuance of a final injunction in order to give the
provisionally reapportioned legislature an opportunity to act effectively, the
court below proceeded in a proper fashion. Since the District Court evinced its
realization that its ordered reapportionment could not be sustained as the basis
for conducting the 1966 election of Alabama legislators, and avowedly intends
to take some further action should the reapportioned Alabama Legislature fail
to enact a constitutionally valid, permanent apportionment scheme in the
interim, we affirm the judgment below and remand the cases for further
proceedings consistent with the views stated in this opinion.
Id. at 587.
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district court held that all three plans were unconstitutional and
ordered a temporary reapportionment that was a hybrid of the
proposals offered to the court."3 The Supreme Court affirmed the
district court's ruling, allowing the temporary reapportionment due
to the dire circumstances and the fact that only a temporary
remedy was being offered.'0 4 Weighted voting, when applied as a
short-term solution, would likely pass constitutional muster. It
provides an effective stop-gap measure for quickly bringing the
distribution of legislative power among legislators in line with the
size of their constituencies. Whether a weighted voting system used
over the course of several years would withstand review at the
appellate level, however, is far from clear.
B. -Usurpation of the Legislature's Power
The crafting of election districts is a sensitive, political matter.
The significance of particular geographic and demographic
boundaries must be carefully considered when drawing district
lines. Perhaps a particular river marks a definite shift of public
interests, or perhaps noteworthy differences exist between two
communities that share a common border. The legislature's duty is
to seek out such significant demarcations and to factor them into
the reapportionment process. The courts limited fact-finding powers
hinder their ability to consider such factors. As such, the legislature
receives deference from the courts, so long as district boundaries
are not so skewed as to demonstrate obvious inequity.'0 5
Implementation of a weighted voting system takes the re-
apportionment process out of the hands of the legislature. Instead
of relying upon the determinations of a competent fact-finder, the
system uses a formula that is incapable of appreciating any form of
subtlety. The reapportionment process, so long as it is within
certain bounds, is supposed to be sufficiently nuanced to properly
reflect the state of the electorate. 0 6 Thus, a weighted voting system
significantly diminishes the emphasis on the legislature in crafting
district boundaries that appropriately reflect the make-up of the
103. Id. at 545-52.
104. Id. at 585-87.
105. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414 (1977).
106. Id. at 422.
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community. Given the Supreme Court's emphasis on the legis-
lature's role in the reapportionment process, it is unlikely that the
courts will look favorably upon a permanent system that tends to
mute the actions of the legislature in a reapportionment scenario.
C. Provincialism and Isolationism
Weighted voting could give rise to provincialism and the pro-
liferation of disproportionate districts if continued over time. If
population trends continue in the direction that brought about the
need for a weighted voting system in Erie County, the fate of
shrinking and growing districts would have to be determined.
Lawmakers must address such issues as at what point a district
becomes so small that it merits decommissioning and, alternatively,
at what point a district becomes so unwieldy that it should be
divided.
Unwillingness to "decommission" districts over time would allow
an increase in the number of representatives in the legislature,
possibly leading to a balkanization of interests as each minor
community would have its own representative fighting for local
interests.1"7 Larger districts could become equally problematic,
especially given the winner-take-all system. l 8 The winner-take-all
system could result in massive districts represented by repre-
sentatives that were only able to achieve pluralities in their
respective elections. A standard is needed to determine at what
point it is necessary to absorb or abolish smaller districts and divide
larger ones.
107. See James L. McDowell, "One Person, One Vote" and the Decline of Community, 23
LEGAL STUD. F. 131, 132 (1999).
108. Under the winner-take-all regime, the fact that only one seat is to be occupied allows
for only one view to triumph on any particular policy issue. As districts become larger and
more diverse, potentially fewer viewpoints are reflected by the election of a particular
candidate. The diversity of interests, furthermore, can lead to a surge in candidates that only
serves to lower the amount of support required for victory, assuming a plurality-based
election. This issue has been a definite concern in terms of race. See Karlan, Undoing the
Right Thing, supra note 52, at 9; Stephen Wolf, Race Ipsa: Vote Dilution, Racial
Gerrymandering, and the Presumption of Racial Discrimination, 11 NOTREDAMEJ.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POLY 225, 227-29 (1997) (discussing the creation of minority-majority districts to
counteract voter dilution of minorities). Even though most scholarship has considered the
issue through the prism of race, similar problems of isolation could be faced by other types
of minority groups.
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Another serious concern is that the weighted voting system could
affect the interpersonal relationships between the legislators. Each
legislator normally has one vote, the same as any other of his
colleagues. The weighted voting system changes that, giving some
legislators more than one vote while reducing other legislators to
less than one vote. There is a certain value to everyone at the table
having an equal voice. Coalitions and compromise become expected
and even necessary tools for advancing programs within the
legislature. Weighted voting, however, would seriously affect the
manner in which coalitions and compromises would come into
existence. Legislators with an increased vote may become more
desirable and influential in the practice of politics-their support
for compromises becomes all the more critical. There would not be
as great a need for compromise and coalition building with those
legislators with a reduced vote.
This shift in the balance of power could have drastic effects on
the lives of common citizens. Larger districts, because of their
legislators' increased clout, would reap the benefits that come
from every compromise brokered by their representative. Smaller
districts, unfortunately, would rarely, if ever, receive such atten-
tion from the legislature as a whole. In short, the strength of a
representative's voice may have a direct correlation to the well-
being of that representative's district.
If the balance of power shifts under a system of weighted voting,
it would shift in a way that disadvantages the districts that are
already hurting. The most diminished legislators, after all, are the
representatives of districts that have lost population relative to the
region. In these districts, presumably something is already drawing
residents away from that community. With so many aspects of a
community's desirability hinging upon population and property
taxes (education, police and fire protection, sanitation services, and
recreation to name a few), 9 studies suggest some correlation
between population trends and the economic health of a commu-
nity.110
109. MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND
STABILITY 62-63 (1998).
110. Id. at 4 (describing how local businesses suffer as middle class consumers move out
of cities causing poverty to become more geographically concentrated).
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One can only imagine the increased incentive to leave if the
community knows that its legislator had a diminished voice in
securing programs and benefits from the legislature. Proponents of
the weighted voting system would have to consider whether they
want to risk further damaging districts that are already facing
difficulties.
D. Census Problems
Another possible problem with the weighted voting system lies in
the fact that it relies upon data from the census. Although the
census is relied upon by all forms of reapportionment plans,
weighted voting places a special emphasis on census data that goes
beyond the reliance of other systems that take factors other than
numbers into account. The only factor considered in establishing
the weight of a legislator's vote is the population of the legislator's
district, determined strictly through census data.
Congress has engaged in a significant amount of debate and
controversy over the means of collecting data in the census pro-
cess. 11' The finer points of the census debate have been thoroughly
addressed by other scholars," 2 but it may be useful to provide a
brief sketch of the debate to show how it affects weighted voting.
The essence of the debate is that the process of gathering data for
the census has systematic flaws that could undermine the very
legitimacy of the census.
The census utilizes a number of different devices to gather
information from the public. These devices range from mailings to
neighborhood canvasses and study of public and private records."'
111. Shane T. Stansbury, Note, Making Sense ofthe Census: The Decennial Census Debate
and its Meaning for America's Ethnic and Racial Minorities, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
403, 417-21 (2000).
112. See, e.g., Barry Edmonston, Using U.S. Census Data to Study Population
Composition, 77 N. DAK. L. REV. 711 (2001) (describing the problems with taking a modem
census); Glenn D. Magpantay, Asian-American Voting Rights and Representation: A
Perspective from the Northeast, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 739 (2001) (discussing statistical
sampling and the undercount of minorities).
113. Neighborhood canvasses are relatively straightforward in concept: workers for the
census go door-to-door, taking information from residents. Stansbury, supra note 111, at 411.
The obvious failures of the canvass are in not counting people who avoid neighborhood
canvassers because they do not wish to be bothered and in counting the homeless, who do not
have a home or residence to visit. See generally id. (describing methodology of census).
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Although these methods can be rather effective in some commu-
nities, a definite concern exists about whether they function as well
in other communities, particularly in neighborhoods with larger
concentrations of minorities and poor persons.' Studies suggest
the census consistently undercounts minorities and the poor,
especially in urban centers."5
Some members of the academy have called for new methods
in gathering census data, such as sampling."6 Sampling would use
the information gathered from the current census data collection
systems and estimate actual population by taking into account
systemic problems with the census information gathering process. 117
Despite all of the discussion of sampling, there does not appear to
be much, if any, momentum in adopting sampling methods for the
purpose of congressional apportionment in the near future.
1 8
All reapportionment schemes rely in some way on census data,
as it is traditionally gathered. Weighted voting, however, makes the
census data the end-all, be-all of crafting districts, and no leeway
whatsoever is given for problems with the census. This process is
distinguished from the normal legislative reapportionment process,
in which the legislature can consider flaws of the census system,
along with any other important factor, when drawing equitable
districts.
Weighted voting, in short, claims to address one person, one
vote considerations directly, but in so doing it employs data that
is highly suspect. To the extent that any errors result from census
data, the greatest effect will probably be felt by minorities and the
poor. In Korman, the City of Buffalo raised the issue that it was
mistreated by the 2000 Census. "' Judge Elfvin noted the City's
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 412.
117. Id. at 414-15.
118. See id. at 427.
119. See Korman v. Giambra, No. 01-CV-0369E(Sr), 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12818, at *3
n.2 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 2001). The City of Buffalo is represented in the Erie County
Legislature by the First, Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Districts. The Second and Third
Districts, in particular, lost substantial political power as a result of the weighted voting
system. The City of Buffalo's basic contention is that even if there were an actual shift of
residents from the City to the suburbs, such a shift would not be nearly as large as data
suggests, given the systemic problems with census data. See id.
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concern, but stated that it "is not being and need not be presently
considered."12 If the City were justified in its concern over the 2000
Census data, then the system employed to rectify a perceived vote
dilution may be itself unjustly diluting the votes of City residents.
VI. BALANCING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS
There are definite merits to employing a system of weighted
voting, in both long-term and short-term scenarios. The politics of
gerrymandering could be avoided entirely and political deadlock in
the legislature would not stand to undermine the process of
reapportionment. Voter confusion would be ameliorated, at least in
terms of picking candidates: voters would not have to deal with
complex map redrawings or the consolidation of districts that would
pit incumbents against one another or squelch challenges. Weighted
voting might also allow for the maintenance of convenient district
boundaries, such as along town and village lines.
The Supreme Court has made it clear that reapportionment is
a legislative function.12 1 So long as the principles of equal protection
are followed, courts must defer to legislative determinations and
fact-finding. Although state legislatures have a fair amount of
discretion in the reapportionment process, district court plans to
remedy legislative failures must meet significantly higher stan-
dards. 22 The Supreme Court has held that the legislature's plans
are prima facie constitutional if they have a variance of under ten
percent, although district court plans must satisfy the de minimis
standard.
23
Such standards alone could undermine the support for a
weighted voting system. Census-related issues, including the
problem of undercounting, should also factor into limiting the
application of a weighted voting system.
Even if the concerns over usurping the legislature can be
overcome, other reasons support avoiding the implementation of a
weighted voting system. Courts will not likely want to implement
a system that might polarize the electorate and isolate districts and
120. Id.
121. See Connor v. Finch, 431 U.S. 407, 414-15 (1977).
122. See id. at 414.
123. See id. at 418.
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their representatives. Given these considerations, such weighted
voting remedies like those employed by Judge Elfvin should be used
sparingly, only after legislative efforts have failed, and then only
temporarily.
EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION
The results of the 2001 elections and subsequent events appear
to have solved Erie County's reapportionment troubles. As
predicted, 2001 witnessed the election of seven Republicans to the
Erie County Legislature and the re-election of dissident Democrat
Albert DeBenedetti, allowing for the formation of a Republican
working majority in the legislature.124 Republican support for the
election of DeBenedetti to Chairman of the Erie County Legislature
cemented the working majority of 8.502 votes."2
The Erie County Legislature passed a reapportionment plan
that reduced the legislature from seventeen to fifteen seats, and
the plan was signed by County Executive Joel A. Giambra on March
15, 2002.126 This plan was formally adopted by referendum in the
2002 November elections. 27 Thus, Erie County's sortie into the
uncharted water of weighted voting will be limited to one election
cycle, just long enough to break the deadlock that prevented re-
apportionment. As an interim remedy, weighted voting in Erie
County can be judged a success. 128
In a more general sense, weighted voting wins on some points,
but loses on several others. In all likelihood, the weighted voting
system would sustain challenges or appeals in the federal court
system. In terms of the considerations with which equal protection
jurisprudence is most concerned, weighted voting appears to meet
124. Vogel, supra note 36.
125. Robert J. McCarthy & Patrick Lakamp, A Call to Action: As the Balance of Power in
the Legislature Shifts, Friends and Foes Alike Say It's Time For Joel A. Giambra to Fulfill
His Pledge to Overhaul Government, BUFFALO NEWS, Jan. 9,2002, at Al, available at 2002
WL 7415548.
126. Robert J. McCarthy, Redistricting is Signed Into Law by Giambra, BUFFALO NEWS,
Mar. 15, 2002, at CI, available at 20002 WL 7422492.
127. Sandra Tan, Voters OK County Redistricting Plan, BUFFALO NEWS, Nov. 6, 2002, at
A15, available at 2002 WL 7446780.
128. Jay Rey, Judge Rejects Request to Toss Weighted Voting, BUFFALO NEWS, June 15,
2002, at B1, available at 2002 WL 7431732.
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constitutional muster. At least on its face, the system appears to be
fair, whether it is scrutinized for purposes of racial equity or
numerical equity.
Weighted voting may suffice as a viable solution in short-term
situations as a means of escaping political deadlock. An essential
ingredient in the successful voting system is to eliminate voter
confusion whenever possible. The weighted voting system does that.
Voters do not have to worry about whether their polling places have
shifted, whether they have been assigned a new district, or whether
they must select between new candidates or two incumbents.
The long-term costs, however, demand that weighted voting not
be used as a remedy in protracted reapportionment battles, or as a
legislative solution unless the situation is dire. There are too many
side effects to a weighted voting system to justify its persistent use.
Keith R. Wesolowski
